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The available minimum wage literature, which is mostly based on US evidence, is not
very useful for analyzing developing countries, where the minimum wage aﬀects many
more workers and labor institutions and law enforcement diﬀer in important ways. The
main contribution of this paper is to present new empirical evidence on minimum wage
eﬀects for a key developing country, Brazil. Using a monthly household survey panel
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formal and informal sectors. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no evidence of adverse employment
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The minimum wage literature contains very limited evidence concerning developing coun-
tries, as noted by Hamermesh (2002), Harisson and Leamer (1997) and Gidling and Terrell
(2004) among others. The available literature, which is mostly based on US evidence, shows
that the minimum wage compresses the wage distribution and has, at most, a small ad-
verse eﬀect on employment (Brown, 1999; Neumark and Wascher, 1992; Williams, 1993;
Card and Krueger, 1995). However, the economics of the minimum wage is diﬀerent in
developing countries, where the minimum wage aﬀects many more workers and labor insti-
tutions and law enforcement diﬀer in important ways. For example, the limited evidence for
Latin America indicates that the wage compression and employment eﬀects are considerably
stronger in developing countries than they are in developed countries (Castillo-Freeman and
Freeman, 1992; El-Hamidi and Terrell, 2002; Maloney and Mendez, 2004; Montenegro and
Pages, 2004). Nonetheless, this literature consists of very few studies (mostly one or two for
each country) and the results are sometimes conﬂicting. For instance, although the evidence
for Brazil also indicates that the minimum wage strongly compresses the wage distribution,
it suggests a small adverse employment eﬀect (Carneiro and Henley, 2001; Neumark et al.,
2005; Lemos, 2004). Hamermesh (2002) argues that much more evidence is required to
evaluate measures such as recent Latin American policymakers’ promises of minimum wage
increases (The Economist, 2002 and 2003).
The main contribution of this paper to the literature and policy debate is to present
new empirical evidence on the eﬀect of the minimum wage for a key developing country,
Brazil. In developing countries a large proportion of workers is outside the umbrella of
minimum wage legislation. In such a context, the common theoretical model used as a
basis for empirical analysis in the literature is the standard Welch-Gramlich-Mincer Two
Sector Model (Welch, 1976; Gramlich, 1976; Mincer, 1976). Following a minimum wage
increase, the principal prediction of the Two Sector Model is that wages in the uncovered
2sector fall as a result of displaced workers in the covered sector moving into uncovered sector
employment. Therefore, the wage eﬀect is expected to be positive in the covered sector and
negative in the uncovered sector, while the expected employment eﬀect is negative in the
ﬁrst and positive in the second.
We test these predictions using a monthly Brazilian household survey from 1982 to 2000
and panel data techniques. We ﬁnd robust evidence of positive wage spillover eﬀects resulting
in a strong wage compression in both the covered and uncovered sectors. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd no evidence of adverse employment eﬀects in either sector. These results, which are
robust to various diﬀerent estimation strategies, are in contrast with the predictions of
the Two Sector Model. Fajnzylber (2001) also found results in contrast with the theory
predictions for Brazil. He used his wage estimates to indirectly derive negative employment
elasticities in both sectors. Conversely, Carneiro (2004), Corseuil and Carneiro (2001) and
Foguel, Ramos and Carneiro (2001) used time series techniques and reported results in line
with the Two Sector Model predictions for Brazil.
To reconcile our results with the existing theory we argue that the Brazilian economy
suﬀers from non-compliance, rather than non-coverage, and thus the predictions from the
Two Sector Model may not hold. For example, Mincer (1976) notes that the prediction of
falling uncovered sector wages is not robust to alternative assumptions on sectoral choice
and unemployment. This suggests that informal sector wages and employment may not
respond to an increase in the minimum wage in the same way that uncovered sector wages
and employment do. Other researchers have also questioned the validity of the Two Sector
Model to explain minimum wage eﬀects in Brazil and Latin America (Barros et al., 1997;
Maloney and Mendez, 2004).
The main policy implication from our ﬁndings is that the minimum wage could be an
eﬀective policy tool in the ﬁght against poverty and inequality without destroying too many
jobs in Brazil. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
3the data, and in Sections 3 and 4 we estimate wage and employment eﬀects. In Section 5
we describe a number of robustness checks and in Section 6 we summarize and conclude.
2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.1 Minimum Wage
The minimum wage was ﬁrst introduced in Brazil in 1940 to provide subsistence income
for an adult worker. The bundle of goods upon which it was based varied across regions,
which was reﬂected in 14 diﬀerent minimum wages. After a steep decline during the 1940s
real minimum wages were adjusted reaching their peak during the boom of the 1950s, when
productivity was high, unions were strong, and the government was populist. Subsequently,
they decreased as a result of the subsequent recession, rising inﬂation, and passive unions.
After the installation of the dictatorship in the mid 1960s, real minimum wages were sys-
tematically devalued because the government associated the then high inﬂation with wage
adjustments. In the early 1980s the minimum wage was set at a national level, after slow
regional convergence. Since then there has been a universal minimum wage for all regions,
demographic groups and labor market categories. However, workers in ﬁrms where compli-
ance is incomplete may earn wages that are lower than the minimum wage. Thus, coverage
is full but compliance is not. With the end of the military regime in the mid 1980s, the new
constitution re-deﬁned the subsistence income for an adult worker and their family. The
m i n i m u mw a g ec o n t i n u e dt ob eu s e da sad e ﬂationary policy tool throughout the 1980s and
most of the 1990s. Since the mid 1990s, under reasonably stable inﬂation, the minimum
wage has again been used as a social policy tool.
The minimum wage data we utilize is from the Brazilian Labor Ministry. In Figure 1
we plot the log real minimum wage, which clearly shows a negative trend between January
1982 and January 2000. Minimum wage increases during this period were subject to the
4rules of ﬁve diﬀerent stabilization plans. The increases were large and frequent, but quickly
eroded by subsequent inﬂation. In early 1986, the nominal minimum wage was increased by
15% and initially adjusted bi-annually. It was then adjusted whenever inﬂation was higher
than 20%. Despite this, the real minimum wage was 25% lower in mid 1987 than it was in
early 1986. The nominal minimum wage was then initially frozen for three months before it
was indexed monthly by past inﬂation. In early 1989, it was again frozen, and in mid 1989
it was again indexed monthly. In early 1990, the real minimum wage was 45% lower than
it was in early 1989. In late 1991, the nominal minimum wage was again indexed monthly.
In 1993, adjustments were bi-monthly and then monthly. In early 1994, adjustments were
made daily, which did not prevent the real minimum wage from falling 40% by mid 1994.
In mid 1995 the nominal minimum wage was increased by 42%, and since then it has been
adjusted annually.
2.2 Wages and Employment
The other data we use is from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey (PME). The
PME is a rotating household panel similar to the US Current Population Survey (CPS).
Households are interviewed for four consecutive months, not interviewed for the following
eight months, and then interviewed again for four additional months. In the PME the panels
are refreshed every two years, rather than every year, as is the case in the CPS. The data
was collected by the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography (IBGE) for the six main
Brazilian metropolitan regions (Salvador, Recife, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo
and Porto Alegre) between January of 1982 and January of 2000. We deﬂate wages using
the IPC (Consumers Price Index), also available from the IBGE.
We split the sample between formal and informal sector workers. The informal sector is
the section of the economy where legislation is not complied with. The standard procedure
in the Brazilian literature is to classify informal sector workers as those who do not hold a
5signed labor contract card, excluding the self-employed (Carneiro and Henley, 2001). (We
later perform robustness checks for the self-employed.1) In Table 1 we provide descriptive
statistics for the poorest region (Recife) and the richest region (Sao Paulo) in the sample.
Wages are lower in Recife, where the share of children, retired and low educated is higher.
Formal sector employment is lower and informal sector employment is higher in Recife. We
thus aggregate the data across regions and across months to exploit this variation across
regions to identify the minimum wage eﬀect on wages and employment in our econometric
models, as we explain in detail below. The average number of observations per region-month
cell is 13,000.
Our wages variable is net monthly real wages. In Figure 2 we plot the Kernel log real wage
distribution for the formal and informal sectors in April-May 1992, which is a representative
year for the remainder of the sample period. The most striking feature of Figure 2 is that
a sizeable spike at the minimum wage level is observed in the distribution of both sectors.
This spike is towards the bottom in the formal sector, whereas it is towards the centre of
the distribution in the informal sector. That is because wages are lower and more dispersed
in the informal sector, as is also evident from Table 1. As a result, the minimum wage
is more binding and non-compliance is larger in that sector. The percentile of the wage
distribution where the minimum wage bites changes over time and across regions; our data
show that while the minimum wage is located between the 5th and 10th percentiles in the
formal sector, it lies between the 15th and 30th percentiles in the informal sector (also see
Table 1).
T h ep r e s e n c eo fas p i k ei nb o t hs e c t o r ss u g g e s t st h a ti np r a c t i c et h em i n i m u mw a g ei s
paid in both sectors, despite of there presumably being non-compliance with the law in the
1We ﬁrst focus our analysis on salaried employees, all of which are covered by the legislation. Here the
main issue is whether ﬁrms where such employees work comply with the legislation. We later focus our
anlaysis on a group of non-salaried workers that are perhaps less likely to be covered by the legislation,
the self-employed. The focus on the formal and informal split results from a traditional hypothesis in the
literature that the destination of workers displaced from the formal sector is the informal sector (McDonald
and Solow, 1985; Carneiro and Henley, 1998; Maloney, 1999; Gonzaga et al., 1999; Soares, 2003; Corseuil
and Carneiro, 2001; McIntyre, 2002).
6informal sector. Here, non-compliance is observed in other aspects of the labor contract,
such as social security taxes, holidays cashed in money, ﬂexible hours, etc. (Amadeo and
Camargo, 1997). Workers take the same pay home (perhaps taking advantage of ﬂexible
working hours) and ﬁrms have lower labor costs (overhead costs are around 100% of the
wage in Brazil). Put diﬀerently, the informal sector oﬀers a way of avoiding the ineﬃciencies
of labor market regulations (Maloney, 1999). The presence of a spike in both sectors has
been documented for Brazil and other Latin America countries (Maloney and Mendez,
2004; Gonzaga et al., 1999). The presence of a spike in the uncovered sector has also been
documented for the US (Card and Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999).
We plot the size of the spike, or “fraction at”, over time across the formal and informal
sectors in Figure 3. “Fraction at” is deﬁned as 0.98wM
t ≤ wt ≤ 1.02wM
t ,w h e r ewM is the
monthly nominal minimum wage and w is the nominal wage.2 This is the main minimum
wage variable that we use in our econometric models below. Figure 3 shows that “fraction
at” has considerable variation over time. For example, it jumped from 2% to 14% (0.3% to
12%) in the formal (informal) sector in response to the minimum wage increase in September
of 1991, immediately after the real minimum wage reached its lowest ever level. This is large
when compared to the 4% spike in the US in 1993 (Dolado et al., 1996). Table 1 shows
that “fraction at” also has considerable variation across regions and is signiﬁcantly larger
in Recife. “Fraction at” in the formal sector is almost ﬁve times larger in Recife than it is
in Sao Paulo, and in the informal sector it is almost twice as large in Recife.
Another striking feature of Figure 2 is the strong compression eﬀect on the wage distri-
bution of both sectors following a minimum wage increase. The compression eﬀect is at the
bottom of the distribution in the formal sector and towards the centre of the distribution in
the informal sector. This is in line with the position of the spike in each sector’s distribution.
2The bounds account for measurement error introduced by rounding approximations. This is because in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fh i g hi n ﬂation as in Brazil, people tend to report rounded wages. All estimates in the paper
were robust to deﬁning “fraction at” with and without bounds.
7This suggests that the minimum wage redistributes in favor of the relatively poor in both
sectors. It appears to be more eﬀective in reducing inequality in the formal sector, where
compliance is more complete. In the informal sector, where non-compliance is larger, the
poorest might be out of the reach of the legislation.
If, in the absence of a minimum wage increase, the wage distribution could be assumed
to be stable over time (if individuals did not change positions within, or drop out of, the
distribution), then this simple comparison of Kernel distributions before and after an in-
crease would provide an estimate the eﬀect of the minimum wage on the wage distribution
(Meyer and Wise, 1983). However, shifts in the distribution might also be due to changes
in other variables. Thus, we control for the eﬀect of other variables (demand and supply
shocks) on wages in our econometrics models below.
Our main employment variable is the employment rate. We calculate the share of those
employed in the formal and informal sectors, in relation to the labor force. In Figure 4 we
plot these shares over time across sectors. The formal sector share is roughly twice as large
as the informal sector share, as is also illustrated in Table 1. The trend is negative for the
formal sector but positive for the informal sector. (The two ﬁgures show a clear change in
their trend following the 1988 constitutional shortening of the length of the working week
and working day, which we control for in our econometrics models below.)
These plots, together with that of the real minimum wage (see Figure 1), do not oﬀer
much support for a negative employment eﬀect in the formal sector, but might oﬀer some
support for a negative eﬀect in the informal sector. For example, the correlation between
the minimum wage and the employment rate is 0.57 in the formal sector and -0.67 in the
informal sector. However, such raw correlations need to be proved robust when the eﬀect
of other variables (demand and supply shocks) on employment is controlled for. We control
for such shocks in our econometric models below. The other employment variable we use is
average hours worked in the working population. The correlation between this variable and
8the minimum wage is 0.12 in the formal sector and 0.45 in the informal sector. The ﬁnal
employment variable we use is total employment, which is the product of the ﬁrst two.3
The correlation between this variable and the minimum wage is 0.59 and -0.57 respectively
in the formal and informal sectors.
3W a g e e ﬀects
3.1 Model Speciﬁcation
We estimate wage eﬀects for the formal and informal sectors separately using a common
reduced form equation that is grounded in the standard neoclassical model (Dickens et al.,
1999; Card and Krueger, 1995):






t +  W
rt (1)
where Wrt is our measure of wages; WM
rt is the monthly real minimum wage; urt−1 is
the past unemployment rate; Xrt are labor supply shifters; fW
r and fW
t are region and
time ﬁxed eﬀects; and  W
rt is the error term in region r and month t, r =1 ,...,6,a n d
t =1 ,...,214. Regional dummies model region growth speciﬁct r e n d s . W et a k eWrt to
mean, in turn, the 10th,2 5 th,5 0 th,7 5 th,a n d9 0 th percentiles, the average and the standard
deviation of the monthly real wage distribution. This allows us to estimate the eﬀect of the
minimum wage throughout the wage distribution (Dickens et al., 1999). Supply shifters are
the proportion of the total population who are younger than 10 years old, between 10 and
24 years of age, women, illiterates, retirees, students, in urban areas, with completed basic
3Total employment (or average hours worked in the labor force) equals average hours worked by the










N ,w h e r eN and Ne are the sample
sizes of the labor force and working population respectively, and h is hours worked.
9(8 years) education and high school (11 years) education; the average years of schooling
in the total population; the proportion of the working population holding two jobs, in the
public, construction and metallurgy sectors. A GLS correction is performed in all models in
the paper to correct for heteroskedasticity arising from aggregation and to account for the
relative importance of each region. Also, standard errors are corrected for serial correlation
across and within regions.
As the nominal minimum wage is constant across regions in Brazil, β
W does not fully
identify the eﬀect of the minimum wage on wages in Equation (1). That is because the
denominator of the real minimum wage drives the variation in the ratio. As a result, the
eﬀect of the inverse of the deﬂator on wages is what is ultimately estimated (Welch and
Cunningham, 1978). Other minimum wage variables that have been suggested in the liter-
ature to circumvent this problem are “fraction aﬀected”, which is deﬁned as the proportion
of workers earning a nominal wage between the old and the new nominal minimum wage
(Card, 1992), and “fraction at”, which we deﬁned in Section 2.2. The intuition for the later
is that a constant minimum wage aﬀects a diﬀerent proportion of workers depending on the
initial level and shape of the wage distribution across regions. This cross region variation is
then exploited to ensure identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of the minimum wage on wages. “Frac-
tion at” is superior because “fraction aﬀected” does not capture the erosion of the minimum
wage in relation to other wages because it is constant at zero when the minimum wage is
constant (Brown, 1999).
The main drawback with using such variables in place of the log real minimum wage in
equations such as Equation (1) is that the interpretation of their coeﬃcient is not straight-
forward. For example, the coeﬃcient of “fraction at” would be informative of the change
in employment given a change in the proportion of workers earning one minimum wage
but not given a change in the minimum wage itself. A more intuitive and policy relevant
minimum wage variable is the interaction of the minimum wage with “fraction at”. This
10gives a weighted minimum wage, where the impact of a national minimum wage increase in
each region is measured by the proportion of workers earning one minimum wage in that











where Frt is “fraction at” as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 . 2a n duW
rt is the new error term. The
change in wages given by a marginal change in the minimum wage is β
W +γWFrt.W ec a n
evaluate this derivative at the average “fraction at” across all regions and sectors (11.6%)
or at the average “fraction at” for a particular sector in a particular region (e.g. 12% in
the Recife informal sector or 3.3% in the Sao Paulo formal sector, as shown in Table 1).
However, as discussed above, β
W does not identify the eﬀect of the nominal minimum wage
on wages, which has been expanded out in the time eﬀects. Thus, we interpret the γW
coeﬃcient as deviations from the mean eﬀect that would have been captured by β
W, but
i n s t e a di sc a p t u r e db yt h et i m ee ﬀects. Therefore, our coeﬃcient of interest here is γW.T o
illustrate, if γW was 1, then a 1% increase in the minimum wage would increase wages by
0.12% in the Recife informal sector and by 0.03% in the Sao Paulo formal sector over and
above the common mean eﬀect.
3.2 Results
We estimate Equation (2) separately for the formal and informal sector. The GLS γW
estimates across sectors are shown in Table 2. They conﬁrm that the minimum wage strongly
compresses the wage distribution of both sectors, as illustrated by the Kernel distributions
in Figure 2. Whereas the compression eﬀect is at the very bottom of the formal sector
11distribution, it is higher up in the distribution of the informal sector. In the formal sector
we observe that the wage eﬀect decreases throughout the distribution, while in the informal
sector it ﬁrst increases then decreases. In the formal sector, a 1% increase in the minimum
wage increases the wages of those in the 25th percentile by 0.33% and of those in the 50th
percentile by 0.10% (evaluated at the average “fraction at” 11.6%). The wage eﬀect is
signiﬁcant and robust up to the 50th percentile. In the informal sector, it increases the
wages of those in the 25th percentile by 0.31% and of those in the 50th percentile by 0.48%.
The wage eﬀect is not signiﬁcant at the 10th percentile; it is signiﬁcant and robust between
the 25th and 90th percentile. This suggests that the wages of the poorest, who are in the
informal sector, remain unaﬀected by the minimum wage legislation. With the compression
eﬀect being towards the centre of the informal sector distribution, its bottom is unaﬀected
by minimum wage increases. As a result, reduction in inequality is small in that sector, as
shown in the last row of Table 2. Finally, despite the diﬀerent location of the compression
eﬀect, the eﬀect on average wages is similar across sectors, though a bit stronger in the
informal sector.
Our main conclusion following from these results is that the minimum wage strongly
compresses the wage distribution of both the formal and informal sectors in Brazil between
1982 and 2000. This is in line with previous empirical evidence on the (aggregate) wage
eﬀect across the wage distribution in the literature (Brown, 1999; Card and Krueger, 1995;
Lemos, 2004). While many authors found limited spillover eﬀects for the US and the UK
(Card and Krueger, 1995; Dickens et al., 1999), spillovers for Brazil and for various countries
in Latin America have been found to be considerably more extensive (Maloney and Mendez,
2004; Gindling and Terrell, 1995 and 2004). Such extensive spillovers may arise because
o ft h es i z e a b l ef r a c t i o no fw o r k e r sa ﬀected by the minimum wage in Brazil, and because
these workers are present in several sectors, which propagates the minimum wage eﬀect
throughout the economy. For example, Fajnzylber (2001) found spillover eﬀects throughout
12the entire wage distribution of both formal and informal sectors in Brazil. Neumark et al.
(2005) documented more limited eﬀects at the bottom of the formal sector wage distribution
for Brazil.
However, although our results are in line with previous empirical results in the literature,
they are in contrast with the predictions of the Two Sector Model. Instead of the expected
positive wage eﬀects in the formal sector and negative wage eﬀects in the informal sector,
we have so far found positive eﬀects in both sectors. We probe the robustness of our results
further in Section 5.
4E m p l o y m e n t E ﬀects
4.1 Model Speciﬁcation
We estimate the employment eﬀects using a common reduced form equation that is grounded
on the standard neoclassical model (Brown, 1999), modiﬁed in the same fashion as Equation













where Nrt is our measure of employment, fN
r and fN
t are region and time ﬁxed eﬀects, and
uN
rt is the error term. We take Nrt to mean, in turn, average hours worked by the labor force,
average hours worked by the working population and the employment rate, as deﬁned in
Section 2.2. The λ
N estimates in the second and third of these equations add to the one in
the ﬁrst equation. This allows us to decompose the total eﬀect of a minimum wage increase
on employment into a hours eﬀect and a jobs eﬀect. To preserve the decomposition, lagged
13average hours worked by the labor force ( Nrt−l)i su s e di na l lt h r e ee q u a t i o n s . 4 Nonetheless,
the decomposition is only approximately true, because the OLS additivity property is not
preserved when a GLS correction is performed.
4.2 Results
We estimate Equation (3) separately for the formal and informal sector. The GLS γN
estimates across sectors are shown in Table 3. They indicate that there is little evidence
of adverse employment eﬀects in either sector, whether in the short run or in the long run
after 2 years of adjustment. Thus, neither the number of workers nor the number of hours
worked appear to change in eather sector following a minimum wage increase. All estimates
are statistically indiﬀerent from zero, and the evidence is taken to mean that the minimum
wage does not aﬀect employment in Brazil.
Our main conclusion is therefore that the minimum wage has no adverse eﬀect on em-
ployment in Brazil between 1982 and 2000, despite the sizeable wage eﬀects found in both
the formal and informal sectors. This is in line with prior evidence in the literature (Card
and Krueger, 1995; Machin et al., 2003), although it is smaller than the -0.1% employ-
ment eﬀect reported in Brown’s (1999) survey. It is also in line with some of the previous
employment eﬀect evidence for Brazil and for other developing countries. For example,
Neumark et al. (2005) estimate small negative, but not always signiﬁcant, hours and jobs
eﬀects for Brazil using formal sector data in low inﬂation periods. In contrast, Fajnzylber
(2001) found evidence supporting negative employment eﬀects for both sectors in Brazil,
and Carneiro (2004), Corseuil and Carneiro (2001) and Foguel, Ramos and Carneiro (2001)
found evidence supporting negative eﬀects in the formal and positive eﬀects in the informal
sector. Maloney and Mendez (2004) found evidence supporting negative employment eﬀects
in the formal and the self-employed sectors in Colombia. Gindling and Terrell (1995) were
4The results were robust to using 12 lags instead but that was thought to prematurely censor the dynamic
adjustment process.
14unable to ﬁnd evidence of an employment eﬀect in the formal sector in Costa Rica, but
found positive eﬀects in the self-employed (informal) sector for Costa Rica. In contrast,
El-Hamidi and Terrell (2002) found evidence supporting an increase in formal employment
and no eﬀect on the self-employed for Costa Rica.
Once again, although our employment results are consistent with our wage results and
are in line with previous empirical results in the literature, they are in contrast with the
predictions of the Two Sector Model. Instead of the expected negative employment eﬀect in
the formal sector and positive employment eﬀect in the informal sector, we found no eﬀect in
either sector. Fajnzylber (2001) also found results in contrast with the theory predictions.
He used his wage estimates to indirectly derive negative employment elasticities in both
sectors. Conversely, Carneiro (2004), Corseuil and Carneiro (2001) and Foguel, Ramos and
Carneiro (2001) used time series techniques and reported results in line with the Two Sector
Model’s predictions. We probe the robustness of our results further in Section 5.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Regional Shocks
The speciﬁcations used above are quite demanding. We have controlled for the eﬀect of
m a c r os h o c k so nw a g e sa n de m p l o y m e n tb yd e ﬁning one dummy for each time period. We
also have controlled for the eﬀect of region speciﬁc growth trends on wages and employment
by adding one dummy for each region to speciﬁcations already in ﬁrst diﬀerences. We further
included dynamics to allow for lagged adjustment, as minimum wage increases might not
aﬀect employment contemporaneously, but in future periods (Brown et al., 1982). Finally,
we have controlled for supply side variables that might be aﬀecting wages and employment
directly. Given such stringent speciﬁcations, we are conﬁdent that the remaining variation
in wages and employment is due to minimum wage changes.
15Our underlying assumption in these speciﬁcations is that unobservable variables that
aﬀect changes in wages and changes in employment are uncorrelated with “fraction at” and
with changes in the real minimum wage. If, however, macro shocks correlated with either
“fraction at” or changes in the real minimum wage aﬀect diﬀerent regions diﬀerently, our
assumption might not be realistic. This assumption might also be unrealistic in the presence
of region speciﬁc shocks correlated with either “fraction at” or change in the real minimum
wage. Therefore, we need to control both for region speciﬁc shocks and for the potentially
diﬀerentiated eﬀect of macro shocks across regions that could be confounded with the eﬀect
of the minimum wage on wages and employment.
We include the change of three regional shock measures in our speciﬁcations, namely,
past regional GDP, past regional inﬂation, and regional tax revenue. Following Card and
Krueger (1995), we also include political measures in our speciﬁcations. These are proxy for
otherwise unobservable factors in a region related to the impact of minimum wage increases.
We use the number of votes in favor and against minimum wage bills to construct our ﬁrst
measure of political support across regions (Card and Krueger, 1995). We also deﬁne two
further variables. We use the timing of elections to deﬁne an “election cycle” (Carmignani,
2003).5 Our basic assumption is that incentives for more generous minimum wage increases
depend on the proximity of elections (Sobel, 1999). We then interact the “election cycle”
with our regional dummies to construct our second measure of political support across
regions. Next, we consider the frequency of minimum wage increases to deﬁne a “voting
cycle” (Lemos, 2005).6 Here our assumption is that when politicians are willing to support
minimum wage increases they might also be more willing to support other macro employment
growth policies. We then interact the “voting cycle” with our regional dummies to construct
our third measure of political support across regions.
5The “election cycle” is deﬁned as a linear time trend between two consecutive elections, but the results
were robust to other functional forms (exponential, squared, square root and log).
6As before, the “voting cycle” is deﬁned as a linear time trend between any two minimum wage increases,
but again the results were robust to other functional forms.
16We re-estimate Equations (2) and (3) including our regional shock measures and our
regional political support measures. These estimates, shown in Panel A of Tables 4 and 5,
are qualitatively similar to our previous estimates (compare with Tables 2 and 3) and thus
our main conclusion from before is maintained. The minimum wage strongly compresses
the wage distribution of both sectors but does not aﬀect employment in either sector. The
compression eﬀect is evident at the bottom of the formal sector distribution, but is higher
up in the distribution of the informal sector. The strongest eﬀect is always at the 10th
percentile in the formal sector and at the 50th percentile in the informal sector.
We further control for region speciﬁc seasonal shocks that might be correlated with
“fraction at” or with changes in the real minimum wage. This is because the minimum
wage in the sample period is systematically increased in May (in 13/16 years), which also
causes the variation in “fraction at” to be systematic. First, we deﬁne seasonal-month
dummies to control for unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects across months (Burkhauser et al., 2000).
Then, we interact these seasonal-month dummies with our regional dummies to separate the
eﬀect of region speciﬁc seasonal shocks from the eﬀect of the minimum wage on wages and
employment. We re-estimate Equations (2) and (3) including our region speciﬁcs e a s o n a l
shock measure. These estimates, shown in Panel B of Tables 4 and 5, are again qualitatively
similar to our previous estimates and thus our main conclusion from before is unchanged.7
7We have also investigated the possibility of other forms of endogeneity biasing our results. Firstly, our
GLS estimates were robust to SUR estimation where we allow for the error terms of our formal and informal
sector equations to be correlated. This indicates that we have controlled for the relevant macro shocks that
could aﬀect employment simultaneously in both sectors. We also performed SUR estimation allowing for
the error terms across regions to be correlated and found robust estimates. Secondly, our GLS estimates
were again robust to GMM estimation using lags of the minimum wage variable and lags of “fraction at” as
well as a number of political variables as instruments following Lemos (2005). The associated F test, Shea
R2, Cragg-Donald and Hansen-Sargan tests conﬁrmed the relevance and validity of our instruments, while
the Hausman test showed no evidence of endogeneity between employment and the real minimum wage or
“fraction at”. Thirdly, we combined GMM and SUR on a three-stage estimation procedure and again found
robust estimates. Finally, we considered the simultaneous eﬀe c to ft h em i n i m u mw a g eo nb o t hs e c t o r s .I f
workers sort themselves into the formal or informal sectors following a minimum wage increase, the sorting
rule is correlated with the minimum wage. However, the Hausman test associated to our GMM estimates
suggests that this correlation is zero in Brazil. This is what we expected, as we argue that workers decide
in which sector to work based on things other than the minimum wage (see Section 2.2). Soares (2003) and
Corseuil and Carneiro (2001) show that there is little evidence of transitions from the formal sector to the
informal sector or self employment, or from the informal sector into unemployment following a minimum
wage increase in Brazil. More generally, most of the literature on sectoral composition changes, selectivity,
sorting and segmentation in the labor market does not include the minimum wage in their sorting rule (Gaag
175.2 Low Inﬂation
A further robustness check consists of restricting our sample to low inﬂation periods (after
July 1994, when inﬂation was stabilized). The motivation here is that the earlier estimates
are for the full sample period, which might be diluting more adverse employment eﬀects in
low inﬂation periods. That is because ﬁrms might respond diﬀerently to a minimum wage
increase depending on the level of inﬂation. In high inﬂation periods, ﬁrms may perceive
the increase as temporary, anticipating the subsequent accommodating monetary policy and
wage-price spiral. Hence they would not adjust employment to avoid adjustment costs (Cox
and Oaxaca, 1981). Conversely, more adverse employment eﬀects might be expected in
low inﬂation periods. Put diﬀerently, we want to test whether our estimates change after
the July 1994 structural break. Furthermore, the high inﬂation period was characterized by
large macroeconomic volatility in Brazil — in particular, with several failed stabilization plans
and stop-and-go cycles. Therefore, the low inﬂation period allows for a better possibility to
identify the eﬀect of a particular variable, i.e. the minimum wage, on wages and employment.
We re-estimate Equations (2) and (3) restricting our sample period to July 1994 onwards.
These estimates, shown in Panel C of Tables 4 and 5, conﬁrm our main conclusion as before
(compare with Tables 2 and 3). The minimum wage compresses the wage distribution of both
sectors but does not aﬀect employment in either sector. In the formal sector, the compression
eﬀect is again evident at the bottom of the distribution. The strongest eﬀect is still at the
10th percentile, but the compression eﬀect is now higher up in the distribution. In the
informal sector, the compression eﬀect is again towards the centre of the distribution. The
eﬀect on the 10th percentile becomes negative, though it remains statistically insigniﬁcant,
and the compression eﬀect is now limited to the bottom half of the distribution.
and Vijverberg, 1988; Funkhouser, 1997; Chahad and Fernandes, 2000; Pisani and Pagan, 2004; Menezes-
Filho et al., 2004). Finally, we estimate reduced form equations at the aggregate regional level and do not
attempt to separate supply eﬀects (e.g. workers self-selection between sectors or decision to participate in
the labor market) and demand eﬀects (e.g. ﬁr m sd e c i s i o n st oﬁre or hire workers), which ultimately depend
on structural mechanisms of adjustment at the micro level.
18In sum, the wage eﬀect, while a little weaker, remains robust. Nonetheless, all employ-
ment eﬀect estimates are stubbornly statistically indiﬀerent from zero. Thus, even in low
inﬂation periods, where more adverse employment eﬀects are expected, the minimum wage
does not adversely aﬀect employment. Neumark et al. (2005) also ﬁnd small negative,
but not always signiﬁcant, hours and jobs eﬀects for Brazil using formal sector data in low
inﬂation periods.
5.3 Low Educated
Our next robustness check consists in restricting our sample to low wage workers. As our
earlier estimates are for the entire working population, more adverse employment eﬀects for
low wage workers might have been diluted. That is because in any region-month cell only
a minority of workers are aﬀected by changes in the minimum wage and any employment
eﬀects for this minority may get swamped by no employment eﬀect for the majority (Stewart,
2002).
We re-estimate Equations (2) and (3) for low educated workers only (those with 4 or less
years of schooling). These estimates, shown in Panel D of Tables 4 and 5, again strengthen
our earlier main conclusions (compare with Tables 2 and 3). The minimum wage strongly
compresses the wage distribution of both sectors but does not aﬀect employment in ei-
ther sector. In the formal sector, the compression eﬀect is again evident and substantially
stronger at the bottom of the distribution; furthermore, the minimum wage now aﬀects the
entire distribution. In the informal sector, the compression eﬀect is once again towards the
centre of the distribution.
In sum, the wage eﬀect is overall stronger and robust. Nonetheless, all employment eﬀect
estimates still remain statistically indiﬀerent from zero, indicating that the minimum wage
does not adversely aﬀect low educated employment in either sector. These estimates are in
line with evidence for US teenagers and for UK low wage workers, where no adverse eﬀects
19on employment have been documented (Card and Krueger, 1995; Machin et al., 2003).
5.4 Self Employed
So far, we have focused on salaried employees, all of which are covered by the legislation,
and the main issue has been whether the ﬁrms, where such employees work, comply with the
legislation. We now focus our anlaysis on a group of non-salaried workers that are more truly
uncovered by the legislation, the self-employed. The intuition is to use the self-employed
as a control group which do not receive the treatment. This will allow us the possibility to
further test the validity of the standard Two Sector Model for Brazil. If the results for the
uncovered self-employed are consistent with the traditional Two Sector Model, we expect a
negative wage eﬀect and a positive employment eﬀect.
We re-estimate Equations (2) and (3) for the self-employed. These estimates, shown in
Panel E of Tables 4 and 5, reinforce our principle ﬁnding that the minimum wage strongly
compresses the wage distribution but does not aﬀect employment. The results here qual-
itatively resemble the results for the informal sector (compare with Tables 2 and 3). The
compression eﬀect is evident at the bottom of the distribution, and it extends through-
out the wage distribution. Nonetheless, all employment eﬀect estimates once again remain
statistically indiﬀerent from zero. This suggests that even in the self-employed uncovered
sector the minimum wage raises wages but does not destroy employment in Brazil.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have presented new empirical evidence on the eﬀect of the minimum wage
across the formal and informal sectors in Brazil, using a monthly household panel survey
from 1982 to 2000. Our principal ﬁnding is that the minimum wage strongly compresses the
wage distribution of both sectors but does not aﬀect employment. The compression eﬀect is
20at the bottom of the formal sector distribution, while is higher up in the distribution of the
informal sector. The employment eﬀect indicates that neither the number of workers nor the
number of hours worked change in either sector following a minimum wage increase. Our
results are robust to diﬀerent estimation strategies and to a number of robustness checks.
For example, in low inﬂation periods, the compression eﬀect is a little weaker. Nonetheless,
even then, when more adverse employment eﬀects were expected, none could be found. The
compression eﬀect is stronger for low educated workers, which could again hint at more
adverse employment eﬀects. Nonetheless, no employment eﬀects could be found. Finally,
no employment eﬀects could be found for the self-employed, despite strong wage eﬀects.
In sum, our evidence for both formal and informal sectors clearly indicates that wage
eﬀects in Brazil are large whereas employment eﬀects are not found. Although this evidence
is in line with previous empirical evidence, it is not in line with theory. The predictions of
the Welch-Gramlich-Mincer Two Sector Model do not seem to hold true for Brazil. Firstly,
a sizeable spike is observed in the wage distribution not only of the formal, but also of the
informal sector. Secondly, substantial positive wage spillover eﬀects are observed in the
informal sector, not only in the formal sector, resulting in a strong compression eﬀect in the
wage distribution of both sectors. Thirdly, no evidence of negative employment eﬀects is
found in either sector. We argue that the predictions of the Two Sector Model do not hold
for Brazil because they follow from the assumption of non-coverage but that the Brazilian
economy suﬀers from non-compliance instead. We argue that there is no obvious reason
why informal sector wages and employment would respond to an increase in the minimum
wage in the same way that uncovered sector wages and employment do, as informality
and uncoverage are rather diﬀerent labor market features. We therefore advocate that the
economics of the minimum wage in developing countries might be very diﬀerent from that of
developed countries — for which most of the literature is available — and that more research
is needed in this area.
21The main policy implication deriving from our ﬁndings is that the minimum wage could
be an eﬀective policy tool in the ﬁght against poverty and inequality without destroying
too many jobs in Brazil. The minimum wage is eﬀective not only in the formal, but also in
the informal sector, where legislation is presumably not complied with. It might thus be a
more eﬀective policy to reduce poverty than policies that attempt to incorporate informal
sector workers into the formal sector, which might generate higher unemployment. Minimum
wage policy could then be complemented by other policies speciﬁcally targetted at the 10%
poorest, as the minimum wage does not reach those at the very bottom of the informal sector
wage distribution. A related policy-relevant issue is the hidden ﬁscal costs of informality
as informal sector workers do not pay social security but receive universal beneﬁts such
as health service and old age retirement pensions. A further related policy implication is
that minimum wage hikes might adversely aﬀect public deﬁcits in the longer term (via the
public sector wage bill and the beneﬁts and pensions bill), undermining the ﬁght against
poverty and inequality. Given these policy implications, we advocate that more research
is needed in this area before the minimum wage can be more convincingly justiﬁed as a
poverty alleviation policy.
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Figure 4 - EMPLOYMENT RATE IN BRAZIL, 1982-2000  33
Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ACROSS REGIONS AND SECTORS                                                      
Variables Recife Sao Paulo
(a poor region) (a rich region)
I - Percentage of Population
aged 0 to 14 years old 0.18 0.15
aged 15 to 24 years old 0.27 0.25
aged 25 to 64 years old 0.47 0.53
aged over 65 years old 0.07 0.07
women 0.45 0.43
students 0.31 0.22
enrolled in schooling 0.38 0.31
literate 0.86 0.95
elementary education   (8 years of schooling) 0.43 0.38
secondary education  (11 years of schooling) 0.14 0.14
graduates 0.08 0.11
retired 0.13 0.11
in urban areas 0.93 0.97
II - Percentage of Workers
metallurgic industry 0.07 0.19
building construction 0.03 0.04
commerce 0.09 0.09
services 0.26 0.29
public sector  0.07 0.05
sample size 2475815 3708834
formal informal formal informal
sector sector sector sector
III - Labour Market Indicators
log 10th percentile real earnings distribution 4.95 4.09 5.51 4.86
log 25th percentile real earnings distribution 5.14 4.56 5.87 5.30
log 50th percentile real earnings distribution 5.57 5.04 6.32 5.86
log 75th percentile real earnings distribution 6.16 5.69 6.89 6.53
log 90th percentile real earnings distribution 6.82 6.47 7.50 7.13
log average real earnings distribution 5.74 5.18 6.43 5.94
log standard deviation real earnings distribution 0.78 0.94 0.79 0.91
log real minimum wage 4.95 4.95 5.09 5.09
"fraction at" 15.4% 12.0% 3.3% 6.5%
employment rate 56.4% 33.2% 66.7% 25.8%
average hours worked by those employed 41.27 42.04 41.43 39.60
average hours worked in the labour force 23.28 13.92 27.64 10.19




Table 2 - EFFECT OF A MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE ON WAGES
FORMAL SECTOR INFORMAL SECTOR
percentiles coefficient standard error coefficient standard error
Full Sample (controlling for common macro shocks and region specific growth trends)
10th percentile 4.87 0.22 0.46 0.33
25th percentile 2.87 0.20 2.65 0.31
50th percentile 0.89 0.19 4.15 0.25
75th percentile 0.04 0.21 1.26 0.25
90th percentile 0.14 0.23 0.73 0.29
mean 1.47 0.12 1.88 0.13
standard deviation -1.02 0.06 -0.27 0.10
(a) The dependent variable is, in turn, various percentiles, the mean and the standard deviation of the log hourly real wage distribution.  
(b) The shock variable is the "interaction of fraction at and the real minimum wage".
(c) These are           GLS estimates in Equation (1), estimated in turn for the formal and informal sectors.  
     The weights are the square root of the inverse of the sample size.  
      Standard errors are White-corrected and serial correlation corrected across and within regions.   
(d) Month and region dummies model time and region fixed effects.  Labour supply shifters are included as controls, namely, the proportion 
      of the total population younger than 10 years old, between 10 and 24 years of age, women, illiterates, retirees, students, in urban areas,
      with completed basic and high school education; the average years of schooling in the total population; the proportion 
      of the working population corresponding to workers holding two jobs, workers in the informal, public, construction and metallurgy sectors.
(e) To reflect a 1% increase in the minimum wage, these estimates have to be multiplied by "fraction at" 













Table 3 - EFFECT OF A MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE ON EMPLOYMENT 
FORMAL SECTOR INFORMAL SECTOR
dependent short run standard long run standard short run standard long run standard
variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
Full Sample (controlling for common macro shocks and region specific growth trends)
total employment -0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.03
hours worked -0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03
employment rate 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.03
(a) Notes as in Table 2, except that:
(b) The dependent variable is, in turn, log average hours in the labour force, log average hours in the working population and log employment rate.   
(c) These are           GLS estimates in Equation (3), estimated separately in turn for the formal and informal sectors.   
n β  
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Table 4 - EFFECT OF A MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE ON WAGES (robustness checks)
FORMAL SECTOR INFORMAL SECTOR
percentiles coefficient standard error coefficient standard error
A - Full Sample (controlling for common macro shocks, region specific growth trends and region specific shocks)
10th percentile 4.95 0.22 0.33 0.33
25th percentile 2.89 0.20 2.59 0.32
50th percentile 0.93 0.18 4.02 0.24
75th percentile 0.13 0.19 1.14 0.25
90th percentile 0.18 0.22 0.61 0.30
mean 1.51 0.10 1.80 0.13
standard deviation -1.00 0.06 -0.29 0.10
B - Full Sample (controlling for common macro shocks, region specific growth trends, region specific shocks and seasonal region specific shocks)
10th percentile 4.80 0.22 0.30 0.35
25th percentile 2.89 0.20 2.44 0.34
50th percentile 0.73 0.19 3.91 0.26
75th percentile 0.09 0.21 0.90 0.27
90th percentile 0.03 0.23 0.56 0.32
mean 1.44 0.11 1.65 0.14
standard deviation -1.01 0.06 -0.26 0.11
C - Low Inflation Period (controlling for common macro shocks and region specific growth trends)
10th percentile 3.62 0.42 -1.64 1.00
25th percentile 1.06 0.62 1.60 0.92
50th percentile 1.24 0.59 2.27 0.81
75th percentile -0.95 0.63 0.53 0.86
90th percentile 0.33 0.92 -1.44 1.08
mean 1.55 0.32 1.40 0.39
standard deviation -0.50 0.22 -0.55 0.30
D - Low Educated (controlling for common macro shocks and region specific growth trends)
10th percentile 4.52 0.26 0.51 0.35
25th percentile 4.14 0.22 1.92 0.33
50th percentile 1.87 0.21 4.01 0.28
75th percentile 0.59 0.23 1.55 0.32
90th percentile 0.47 0.25 1.01 0.36
mean 1.94 0.14 1.86 0.17
standard deviation -0.98 0.09 -0.22 0.14
E - Self Employed (controlling for common macro shocks and region specific growth trends)
10th percentile 1.86 0.34
25th percentile 2.38 0.35
50th percentile 1.21 0.30
75th percentile 1.16 0.33
90th percentile 1.10 0.40
mean 1.51 0.13
standard deviation -0.77 0.06




Table 5 - EFFECT OF A MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE ON EMPLOYMENT (robustness checks)
FORMAL SECTOR INFORMAL SECTOR
dependent short run standard long run standard short run standard long run standard
variable coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error coefficient error
A - Full Sample (controlling for common macro shocks, region specific growth trends and region specific shocks)
total employment -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.03
hours worked -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03
employment rate 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.03
B - Full Sample (controlling for common macro shocks, region specific growth trends, region specific shocks and region specific seasonal shocks)
total employment -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.10 0.10 -0.04 0.03
hours worked -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.04
employment rate -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.13 0.08 -0.06 0.04
C - Low Inflation Period (controlling for common macro shocks and region specific growth trends)
total employment -0.13 0.20 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.30 0.03 0.07
hours worked -0.07 0.18 -0.03 0.09 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.09
employment rate -0.06 0.10 -0.04 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.02 0.07
D - Low Educated (controlling for common macro shocks and region specific growth trends)
total employment -0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.24 0.03 0.06
hours worked 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.08
employment rate -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.02 0.06
E - Self Employed (controlling for common macro shocks and region specific growth trends)
total employment 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.04
hours worked 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.04
employment rate 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05
(a) Notes as in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 